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One of the key preoccupations of scholars of contem-
porary politics is the political backlash of social unease
about immigration and cultural diversity. In particu-
lar, support for populist radical right (PRR) parties
and movements has swelled in previous decades,
which has triggered extensive political and scholarly
debate (Backes and Moreau, 2012). Whether we like
it or not, many citizens support parties and move-
ments that promote xenophobia, ethno-nationalism
and anti-system populism (Rydgren, 2007). 
This review provides an overview and assessment
of the scholarship on the PRR in Western European
democracies. First, we briefly discuss the definitional
debate about what constitutes the PRR family.
Second, we review the literature on supply-side expla-
nations for the fortunes of PRR parties and move-
ments. Third, we discuss research on the
consequences of the emergence and rise of PRR par-
ties and movements. Do they constitute a corrective
or threat to democracy (cf. Mudde and Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2012)? There is now a growing literature
that tackles this question in an empirical manner
(Immerzeel and Pickup, 2015). The review concludes
with a discussion of the future directions that theoriz-
ing and research could take. 
We narrow our scope to the PRR in contemporary
Western European democracies. Nevertheless, the the-
ories, findings and suggestions for future work could
also be applicable to comparable cases elsewhere, such
as the Tea Party in the United States (Parker and
Barreto, 2014; Williamson et al., 2011) and PRR par-
ties and organizations in Eastern Europe (Allen, 2015;
Minkenberg, 2015; Pirro, 2015). 
Until today a strict labour division seems to divide
sociologists from political scientists, with each disci-
pline focusing on the non-electoral and electoral
channel, respectively (Rydgren, 2007). Social move-
ment protests have generally been dominated by ‘the
left’, while ‘the right’ mainly uses the electoral channel
to voice its discontent, instead of taking to the street
(Hutter, 2014; Van der Meer et al., 2009).
Consequently, social movement scholars tend to over-
look the most important contemporary actors mobi-
lizing against the consequences of globalization and
immigration: the populist radical right (Hutter and
Kriesi, 2013). As Caiani et al. (2012: 4) put it: ‘while
political party studies provide more and increasingly
sophisticated analyses of radical right parties, social
movement studies ... has been slow to address the
“bad side” of social movement activism’. Only when
sociologists widen their perspective to the electoral
channel, are we able to fully grasp the implications of
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globalization and large-scale immigration for politi-
cal contention. 
Definitional debate on radical right-
wing populism
Different labels such as ‘extreme right’ (Arzheimer,
2009; Bale, 2003; Lubbers et al., 2002), ‘far right’
(Ellinas, 2007; Erk, 2005) and ‘populist radical right’
(Mudde, 2007) are used interchangeably to refer to
the same organizations, such as the French Front
National (FN), Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and
Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest (VB). A consensus has
emerged that they constitute one single
family. According to Mudde’s (2007) influential def-
inition, three features characterize this family:
nativism, populism and authoritarianism.
The most important common denominator is
their nativist stance. This exclusionist, ethno-nation-
alist notion of citizenship is reflected in the slogan
‘own people first’ (Betz, 1994; Immerzeel et al.,
2016; Rydgren, 2005a). The label ‘radical’ refers to
the non-centrist, outspoken position at the far end of
the political spectrum on issues related to immigra-
tion and ethnic diversity (Akkerman et al., 2016).
Since they strongly hold issue-ownership over immi-
gration issues (Abou-Chadi, 2016) some scholars
simply refer to the PRR as anti-immigration parties
(Fennema, 1997; Van der Brug et al., 2005).
Second, PRR groups share their populist, anti-
establishment rhetoric (Carter, 2005; Ivarsflaten,
2008; Mudde, 2007; Pelinka, 2013). Populism is a
communication style or ‘thin’ ideology that divides
society into two homogeneous groups: the ‘pure peo-
ple’ and the untrustworthy ‘corrupt elite’ (Akkerman
et al., 2013; Canovan, 1999; Jagers and Walgrave,
2007; Mudde, 2007). 
Third, authoritarianism implies stressing themes
like law and order and traditional values. Relatedly,
PRR groups favour strong leaders who reflect ‘the
will of the people’ (Inglehart and Norris, 2016).
However, there is no consistent empirical relation-
ship between authoritarianism and PRR party pref-
erence (Dunn, 2015). At least in Scandinavia and
the Netherlands, ‘new’ PRR parties have stressed
progressiveness – liberty, women’s rights, individual-
ism – against reactionary authoritarian standpoints
(Akkerman and Hagelund, 2007; De Koster et al.,
2014; Rydgren, 2005b). Moreover, the picture
painted of social movement activists is at odds with
traits such as conformism or submission to tradition-
al authority (Klandermans and Mayer, 2006)
It is often stated that radical right populism
endangers some of the constitutional foundations of
liberal democracies: pluralism and the protection of
minorities (Abts and Rummens, 2007; Betz, 2004;
Mudde, 2007). At the same, however, scholars agree
that it distinguishes itself from political extremism,
in the sense that PRR supporters and activists respect
democracy, whereas extremist groups go beyond the
limits of the procedures which define the democrat-
ic political processes (Betz and Johnson, 2004;
Klandermans and Mayer, 2006; Minkenberg, 2011;
Rydgren, 2007). 
In a nutshell, substantial progress has been made
in three respects. First, scholars have diverted their
attention away from trivializing definitional debates
about what right-wing radicalism or populism really
‘is’. Instead, they have increasingly focused on more
informative discussions about theories and hypothe-
ses. Second, scholars increasingly focus on actually
measuring the ideological characteristics and policy
stances of both PRR and mainstream parties (Eger
and Valdez, 2015; Immerzeel et al., 2016; Pauwels,
2011a; Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011). As a corollary,
most scholars have abandoned reasoning in clear-cut
categories. A strict ‘either–or’ logic (Mudde, 2007;
Van Kessel, 2015) has been replaced by the argu-
ment that populism is more a ‘matter of degree’
(Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013; Pauwels, 2011a).
Likewise, parties can position themselves somewhere
on the left–right or cosmopolitan–nativist dimen-
sion (Akkerman and Rooduijn, 2015; Van Spanje,
2011a). Nevertheless, for many research questions
requiring case selection it is still necessary to delin-
eate which ones deserve the label PRR and which
ones not. 
Explanations for failures and 
successes: demand- and supply-side
approaches 
Explanations for the rise and fortunes of PRR parties
and movements are usually grouped into two
approaches: one focusing on grievances and one on
political constraints and opportunities. This corre-
sponds with the distinction between demand-side
and supply-side factors (Klandermans, 2004;
Koopmans et al., 2005; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren,
2007; Van der Brug and Fennema, 2007; Van der
Brug et al., 2005). Supply-side factors can be divid-
ed into internal factors (De Lange and Art, 2011;
Norris, 2005), like organizational characteristics
(Art, 2011; De Witte and Klandermans, 2000;
Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000) and external factors,
such as institutional frameworks and elite responses
(Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Kitschelt and
McGann, 1995). External implies that they cannot
be controlled by PRR actors themselves (Goodwin,
2006). These two sets of explanations should be
3
Muis and Immerzeel Radical right populism
viewed as complementary, rather than competing
theories (Van der Brug and Fennema, 2007).
Demand-side explanations are important to under-
stand why the PRR emerged in the first place.
This review focuses on supply-side factors. We
will ignore demand-side accounts, because the socio-
demographic characteristics and attitudes of radical
right supporters have already been extensively inves-
tigated and reviewed (Arzheimer, 2012; Inglehart
and Norris, 2016; Mudde, 2010; Van der Brug and
Fennema, 2007). The findings can be summarized
into two general claims. First, protest is not ‘unideo-
logical’, but clearly directed against policies concern-
ing immigration, integration and law and order
(Eatwell, 2000; Swyngedouw, 2001). Alternatively,
now and then, supporters of PRR groups are some-
what vaguely characterized as irrational and alienat-
ed, seemingly unconnected to any particular values,
policy preferences or ideology. However, this claim is
empirically untenable. Voting for PRR parties is
largely motivated by ideological and pragmatic con-
siderations, just like voting for other parties (Van der
Brug et al., 2000; Zhirkov, 2014). In a similar vein,
Klandermans and Mayer (2006: 267) conclude that
radical right activists are socially integrated and
appear as ‘perfectly normal people’ (cf. Blee and
Creasap, 2010: 271). 
Second, it has become clear that a complete and
satisfying explanation for PRR popularity and pres-
ence in the political system needs to go beyond the
demand-side model. It fails to explain short-term
fluctuations within countries or large differences
between otherwise mostly similar countries (Coffé,
2005). Reviewing social structure and demand
explanations, Norris (2005: 14) states that ‘their fail-
ure to provide an overall explanation is clear from
even a simple glance at the clear contrasts in radical-
right fortunes found between neighbouring states
which appear to share similar cultural values, postin-
dustrial service-sector economies, and comparable
institutions of representative democracy’. For exam-
ple, Austria, where the FPÖ has enjoyed consider-
able electoral successes, is hardly more deprived than
Germany, where the PRR is weak. Similarly, com-
paring the divergent fortunes of the Walloon Front
National and Flemish VB, it is hard to imagine that
immigration and unemployment have created signif-
icantly larger electoral demands for the radical right
in Flanders compared to the Walloon region
(Arzheimer, 2012). 
The external supply-side: political
constraints and opportunities
According to external supply-side explanations, suc-
cessful mobilization is first and foremost the result of
constraints and opportunities that the political and
institutional context offers. Examples of such exter-
nal characteristics are the electoral system, the ‘polit-
ical space’ (or ‘ideological room’) left open by
political competitors, responses from
established/mainstream parties (i.e. any party that is
not considered as part of the PRR) or splits among
the political elite, most notably on the issue of the
multicultural society. Several researchers have con-
vincingly shown that such factors matter, both for
the action repertoire that PRR actors adopt (Caiani
and Borri, 2013; Koopmans et al., 2005) and their
electoral performances (Arzheimer, 2009; Arzheimer
and Carter, 2006; Carter, 2005; Lubbers et al., 2002;
Norris, 2005; Van der Brug et al., 2005). 
Institutional framework 
Political-institutional variables generally show not
much variation. These deeply embedded or fixed
opportunities are obviously most useful for compar-
ing different national settings, explaining country
differences in PRR success. Scholarship that traces
the impact of the institutional framework include
works that assess whether the level of federalism and
the electoral system affect the popularity of the PRR
(Carter, 2002; Hakhverdian and Koop, 2007; Swank
and Betz, 2003; Veugelers and Magnan, 2005).
According to Kitschelt (2007: 1193), a review of
institutional accounts of PRR party strength is ‘a
frustrating business’. He notes that ‘although there
are plenty of studies that test for institutional effects,
they tend to be theoretically misspecified and empir-
ically not capturing the configuration of institution-
al rules that should make a difference for electoral
support of such parties’. Moreover, in short, the gen-
eral lesson is that the impact is modest. 
Several studies have indicated that more propor-
tional electoral systems are conducive to the entrance
or success of new parties (Tavits, 2006), but findings
regarding radical parties in particular have been
mixed (Carter, 2005; Golder, 2003; Jackman and
Volpert, 1996; Norris, 2005; Van der Brug et al.,
2005). Electoral thresholds may induce potential
radical right voters to support mainstream parties
when they perceive their favourite party to be too
weak to overcome the barrier to entry (Givens,
2005). Clearly, the institutional configuration most
unfavourable for newcomers exists in Britain
(Kitschelt, 2007). That the British radical right has
‘failed’ is often attributed to the majoritarian 
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electoral system as primary reason (John and
Margetts, 2009). 
Political space 
In addition to the institutional framework, the emer-
gence and rise of the PRR is affected by the position-
ing of the political parties within the policy space
(Kitschelt and McGann, 1995). Political space refers
to the degree to which mainstream parties (or mod-
erate-right parties in particular) already occupy the
electoral terrain of the populist right. For that mat-
ter, the positions of the established parties shape the
electoral fortunes of any ‘niche’ party (Meguid,
2005). When they ideologically converge, they leave
a ‘gap’ in the electoral market, which can potentially
be exploited by challengers. Kriesi et al. (2006,
2012) argue that where established parties follow a
moderate course in favour of the ‘winners’ of global-
ization, they provide an opportunity for the creation
of parties that mobilize the ‘losers’. Several studies
indeed found that ideological convergence between
mainstream parties benefited the entrance or success
of radical new parties (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006;
Carter, 2005; Norris, 2005; but see Veugelers and
Magnan, 2005). 
We need to distinguish issue positions from issue
salience. Therefore, mainstream parties have three
strategies at their disposal: remain silent on the par-
ticular issue (dismissive), distance itself from pop-
ulist anti-immigrant viewpoints (adversarial), or
adopt a similar position (accommodative). Meguid
(2008) argues that issue salience will only enhance
PRR support when mainstream parties declare hos-
tility toward the niche party’s policy position. If
mainstream parties employ accommodative tactics,
electoral support for PRR contenders will diminish.
Many scholars similarly argue that the PRR loses out
when mainstream parties adopt restrictive positions
on immigration (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006;
Kitschelt and McGann, 1995). This strategy may
however backfire (Bale, 2003). Eatwell (2000: 423)
for instance observed that mainstream parties ‘play
with fire’ when they adopt anti-immigrant themes
because it legitimizes the agenda of the PRR.
Political space is measured in different ways, for
different time periods. Partly due to this variation,
the results of studies on the effect of the political
agenda of other parties on the popularity of PRR
challengers show a mixed picture. For instance, using
Eurobarometer surveys (1980–2002) and party
statements on internationalism, multiculturalism,
national lifestyle and law and order from the
Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP), Arzheimer
(2009; cf. Arzheimer and Carter, 2006) found that
the ideological position of the established major
moderate-right party (labelled ‘toughness’) had no
significant effect on cross-national differences in the
amount of support for the PRR. On the other hand,
saliency, the relative amount of these statements in
the manifestos of all established parties (ignoring the
direction of the statements), had a positive impact
on levels of PRR support. 
In contrast, Van der Brug et al. (2005) found that
PRR parties are more successful when the moderate-
right occupies a more centrist position on a general
left–right scale (it is unclear what a position on this
scale exactly signifies). They relied on the European
Elections Studies data (1989–1999) and use respon-
dents’ perceptions to measure party positions. And
in this case, the extent to which the anti-immigra-
tion parties’ mainstream competitor emphasized the
core issue of the radical right was not significant,
although they measured saliency similarly as
Arzheimer (using the CMP data) by selecting the
issues crime, negative references to multiculturalism
and positive references to ‘the national way of life’.
The role of  the media environment 
The above-mentioned contradiction could perhaps
be solved when we complement the political space
approach with the notion that opportunities and
constraints need to become visible through public
statements in order to become relevant (Koopmans
and Olzak, 2004). Political contention increasingly
consists of a battle over attention and approval in the
public debate (Castells, 1997). Populist movements
rely heavily on the media, and the controversial,
tabloid-style language of its leaders flourishes well in
a ‘media logic’ in which newsworthiness is increas-
ingly based on conflicts and scandals (Aalberg et al.,
2016).
The role of the public debate corresponds better
with an externalist ‘opportunity’ view than with an
internalist approach because gaining access to the
mass media is largely beyond the control of PRR
challengers themselves – gatekeepers and established
political actors let them appear on stage. For smaller
or marginal parties, the media are arguably more
important than for established major parties, because
they often lack sufficient organizational and financial
means to get their message across to potential adher-
ents. Like social movements, they need the media far
more than that the media need them (Gamson and
Wolfsfeld, 1993). 
There are many indications that the ‘media fac-
tor’ shapes the fortunes of PRR groups. For example,
the French FN made its electoral breakthrough in
1984 only after Jean-Marie Le Pen was given access
to state television (Eatwell, 2005). His popularity
increased remarkably after he appeared on a popular
talk show called The Hour of Truth: voter intentions
for FN doubled from 3.5% to 7% (Ellinas, 2009;
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Ignazi, 2003). Another example is the ‘pro-Haider
line’ (i.e. favourable coverage for the FPÖ) of the
Kronen Zeitung, Austria’s largest newspaper, between
1986 and 2000 (Art, 2007). 
Media-related independent variables can be
grouped into (1) media attention for issues associat-
ed with the PRR and (2) attention for PRR actors.
Regarding the first, the empirical findings are incon-
clusive. On the one hand, news coverage on the
issues of immigration and integration, and law and
order enhances the electoral attractiveness of PRR
parties (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2007;
Plasser and Ulram, 2003; Walgrave and De Swert,
2004). This finding confirms the agenda-setting
hypothesis, which holds that issues that appear fre-
quently in the news tend to become the issues that
voters deem important. Combined with the idea that
the electorate will support the most credible propo-
nent of a particular issue, it follows that media pub-
licity for issues that are ‘owned’ by anti-immigration
parties enhances their electoral attractiveness (Muis,
2015).
Several researchers have also investigated the
effect of news coverage on PRR actors (Lubbers,
2001; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2001; Muis, 2015;
Vliegenthart et al., 2012). Scholars have differentiat-
ed between coverage for populist right speakers and
for responses of other actors, between positive and
negative coverage (Bos et al., 2010; Koopmans and
Muis, 2009; Muis, 2015), and between the visibility
of leaders and parties (Vliegenthart et al., 2012). 
Stewart et al. (2003: 236) argue that any media
coverage gives advantage to political figures since ‘it
enhances their visibility and furthers their goals, by
producing some kind of public legitimation’.
Research has shown that PRR leaders have clearly
profited from media prominence, like Pim Fortuyn
(Koopmans and Muis, 2009) and Geert Wilders
(Bos et al., 2010). Vliegenthart et al. (2012) find that
party visibility enhanced electoral support for five of
the six anti-immigrant parties they investigated,
namely VB, Party for Freedom (PVV), Republikaner,
National Democratic Party for Germany (NPD) and
German People’s Union (DVU). The Dutch Centre
Democrats (CD) was the one exception. 
Muis’s (2015) study on the CD showed two
opposite effects: negative publicity was electorally
harmful, but at the same time increased media visi-
bility. The party did not increase its popularity when
it achieved media access because the outright racist
claims of its leader Hans Janmaat provoked harsh
criticism. But when trying to attract as much atten-
tion as possible and gaining an influential voice in
the debate, ‘any publicity is good publicity’.
Apparently, both news on support and on criticism
gives actors newsworthiness and greater opportuni-
ties to put their own viewpoints in the spotlight. 
The difficulty is thus to find the right balance
between enhancing newsworthiness and electoral
credibility. Populist leaders face a trade-off between
‘being somewhat unusual and provocative ... (in
order to guarantee newsworthiness and therefore
prominence)’ and being ‘taken seriously as a party’
(Bos et al., 2010: 143). 
To conclude, media effects are conditional on
which stance is promoted. Future studies could be
enriched by devoting more attention to adaptation
and ‘upward dynamics’. For instance, Clarke et al.
(2016) argue that an escalation of volatility in the
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
increased publicity for the party, which in turn
prompted further electoral growth. Media visibility
and attracting additional adherents seem to reinforce
each other (Koopmans and Muis, 2009; but see Van
der Pas et al., 2013). 
Repression, cordon sanitaire
This brings us to the role of repression and legal
measures, such as bans and prosecutions. A similar
logic applies here: the effect of repression is condi-
tional. Its effects may depend on the politician or
group targeted and the situation they are in. Another
relevant factors is the nature of the statements in
question (Van Spanje and De Vreese, 2015). For
instance, the hate-speech charges pressed on Geert
Wilders in 2009 considerably boosted electoral sup-
port for his party (Van Spanje and De Vreese, 2015).
Wilders had already established himself as a power-
ful politician by the time it was decided that he was
to stand trial. He had already obtained much legiti-
macy and media visibility and his party already held
nine seats in the national parliament. 
The impact of prosecution is very different for
politicians and groups on the fringe. When move-
ment activists are faced with legal and social sanc-
tions (e.g. public disapproval and exclusion),
protesting is a costly business and the ability to
attract a wider support-base is undermined.  
Countries also differ significantly in laws regulat-
ing the Internet, and thus how favourable a national
context is for the online activities of radical right-
wing groups (Caiani and Parenti, 2013). In addition
to legal measures, PRR parties sometimes suffer
political exclusion in the form of a refusal by other
parties to cooperate with them (a so-called cordon
sanitaire) (Akkerman et al., 2016). It is however not
clear whether it is an effective strategy if the purpose
is to undermine electoral support. Results on the
effects of exclusion on electoral outcomes of PRR
parties are mixed (Pauwels, 2011b; Van Spanje and
Van der Brug, 2009). We will return to the exclu-
sion-radicalization thesis, which holds that excluded
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parties will radicalize their ideological stances
(Akkerman et al., 2016).
Internal supply-side factors: 
characteristics of the PRR
From an internal supply-side perspective, PRR par-
ties and movements are largely ‘masters of their own
success’ (Carter, 2005; Goodwin, 2006; Mudde,
2007). We cannot reduce them to the passive conse-
quences of socio-economic processes and external
political conditions, but should treat them as shapers
of their own fates. A successful PRR party employs
strategic flexibility in order to exploit whatever
favourable circumstances arise (Ignazi, 2003). We
can distinguish two factors: ideology and organiza-
tional structure, including leadership (Carter, 2005;
Goodwin, 2006). 
The role of  ideology
What parties most importantly can achieve through
their own actions is to find a beneficial position in
the policy space. Kitschelt and McGann (1995)
claimed that the ideological ‘winning formula’ com-
bines culturally exclusionist/authoritarian positions
with liberal pro-market positions on socio-economic
policies. However, the position that is said to make
the PRR successful has changed over time (De
Lange, 2007; Kitschelt, 2004). The PRR has aban-
doned right-wing economic stances (Eger and
Valdez, 2015) and adopted protectionism (Rydgren,
2013) and ‘welfare chauvinism’, the view that social
benefits should be restricted to natives (Andersen
and Bjørklund, 1990; Oesch, 2008; Schumacher
and Van Kersbergen, 2016).
Most PRR groups are comparable because they
share the nativist stance as their unique selling point.
However, at the same time they are distinct in their
ideological character and framing, and these differ-
ences have crucial consequences in terms of the par-
ties’ fortunes. The ‘master frame’ (combining
nativism with populism) needs to be modified to the
particular national political and cultural context in
which these groups operate (Caiani and Della Porta,
2011; Rydgren, 2005b).
Carter (2005), who included not only PRR, but
also non-democratic parties, demonstrated a relation
between the type of ideology parties employ and
their success: more extreme parties are less successful.
She encountered some notable exceptions. The
Dutch CD was for instance a deviant case: most of
the party’s ideological counterparts have flourished,
like in Austria (FPÖ), France (FN) and Belgium
(VB). The ideological character does not only have
direct effects on the fortunes of parties, it also inter-
acts with other explanatory factors. Golder (2003)
found that increasing unemployment and high levels
of immigration only yield more electoral success for
the group of radical right parties he labelled ‘pop-
ulist’, but not for the ones that were labelled as ‘neo-
fascist’. Despite these two examples, to date, research
that elaborates the internal supply-side notion that
one’s ideological stance crucially matters, and sys-
tematically tests effects of PRR parties’ platforms is
relatively scarce (for another exception see Kitschelt
and McGann, 1995); the focus on opportunities and
demand-side factors has clearly prevailed. Instead of
figuring as an explanatory factor, party ideology has
played a more dominant role in delimiting the
dependent variable. 
The studies of Carter (2005) and Golder (2003)
cited above illustrate a remarkable weakness that has
hampered a fruitful elaboration of explanations
based on ideological positioning: Carter considers
the CD as similar in ideological outlook to, for
instance, the FPÖ, FN and VB, based on an exten-
sive typology that (in theory) distinguishes no fewer
than 16 mutually exclusive sub-types within the
family of the radical right; in contrast, according to
a straightforward dichotomy outlined by Golder, the
CD is different from these three other radical  right
parties. 
Future work in this field could make progress in
several ways. First, it could benefit from studies on
the political space provided by the mainstream par-
ties, which has led to much more fruitful research
and findings (Arzheimer, 2009; Arzheimer and
Carter, 2006; Koopmans et al., 2005; Meguid, 2005;
Norris, 2005). As we discussed earlier, in contrast to
party-centric explanations, the ideological niche
available on the electoral market is usually measured
with continuous variables. 
Second, more sophisticated behavioural models
of party strategies are useful (Kitschelt, 2007). In
order to explain success, we should not only try to
identify a certain policy package that ‘works’ benefi-
cially. In addition, we need to establish a deeper
explanation by providing the mechanism by which
parties are able or inclined to arrive at successful
positions over time. Only a few accounts of far-right
populism clearly explicate why or how successful
populist leaders were able to find a ‘successful posi-
tion’ and why most other attempts of politicians
failed to do so (Muis and Scholte, 2013). 
Organizational arguments and leadership
Besides ideology, organizational characteristics such
as a lack of financial resources, appealing leadership
and shortfall of active membership have frequently
been proposed as pivotal factors for the success or
failure of PRR parties and movements (Art, 2011).
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Lack of coherence of party organizations and intra-
party conflicts have often hampered PRR parties
(Heinisch and Mazzoleni, 2016).
However, organization characteristics that are
supposedly beneficial or indispensable  often do not
seem to be relevant in order to account for the
impressive performance of populist challengers. As
pointed out earlier, many leaders rely almost entirely
on media attention, and successful trajectories often
illustrate how media visibility can compensate for
organizational weaknesses (Ellinas, 2009; Mazzoleni,
2008). The growth of active membership and the
building and improvement of an organization often
lag behind success, instead of the other way around:
media attention and electoral support are first suc-
cessfully mobilized, then organizational and finan-
cial resources follow. In a review article on party
organization effects, Ellinas (2009: 219) states that
organizational arguments ‘would need to carefully
trace the evolution of party organisations to establish
the direction of causality’. His evidence from the
French FN indicates that organizational growth
seems to be rather the consequence than the cause of
electoral party success, especially during the earlier
stages of development. In a similar vein, De Witte
and Klandermans (2000) identified a ‘circle of
organisational weakness’: weak organizations (like
the Dutch CD) remained weak, whereas, in contrast,
strong organizations (like the Flemish Bloc in
Belgium) became stronger over time. In sum, orga-
nizational resources seem often both a cause and a
result of success. As a genuinely ‘independent vari-
able’, organizational strength might be more impor-
tant to explain the persistence of parties after their
initial breakthrough (Ellinas, 2007, 2009). 
De Witte and Klandermans (2000) argued that
charismatic leaders who are able to maintain peace in
an organization can instigate an upward spiral of
organizational strength (cf. Klandermans and Mayer,
2006). Charismatic leadership is indeed a prominent
supply-side explanation in the academic literature
(Deiwiks, 2009; Eatwell, 2005; Lubbers et al.,
2002). 
However, the charisma explanation suffers from
the tendency of circular reasoning (Van der Brug and
Mughan, 2007; Van der Brug et al., 2005).
Charisma is a legitimization for those who appear to
be the ‘heroes of a war’ and can just as suddenly van-
ish as it appears. If a leader is unsuccessful, or if the
leadership fails to benefit the followers, charismatic
authority can quickly disappear. Max Weber (1947
[1921]) illustrates this by noting that even Chinese
monarchs could sometimes lose their status as ‘sons
of heaven’ because of misfortune, such as defeat in
war, floods or drought. To conclude, outstanding
charismatic appeal is thus better seen as an emergent
situational characteristic, rather than attributed to
the skills and personality of the leader concerned. 
Consequences of PRR party and
movement success
In addition to the causes of PRR fortunes, more
recently, scholars have increasingly formulated and
tested hypotheses on the consequences of the emer-
gence and rise of PRR parties and movements
(Mudde, 2013; Rosanvallon, 2008). Some scholars
have claimed that the PRR constitutes a serious
threat to democracy because it emphasizes a homo-
geneous voice – the ‘voice of the people’ – and
threatens the rights and protection of minority
groups (Abts and Rummens, 2007; Mudde, 2007). 
Others have noted that PRR parties, or populist
and Eurosceptic parties more generally, actually cor-
rect democratic deficiencies by speaking to a large
group of citizens disillusioned with mainstream
politicians (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012;
Usherwood and Startin, 2013). Citizens feel that
there is someone who has ‘listened to their griev-
ances’ (Ivarsflaten, 2008) and enables them to
become passionately, rather than rationally, involved
in politics (Mouffe, 2005). 
Although the debate about whether the PRR
constitutes a threat or corrective to democracy is
often a normative one, the question of whether there
is a relationship between PRR successes and various
outcomes associated with the quality of democracy
(such as voter turnout) can be empirically tested
(Immerzeel, 2015). Therefore, and related to the
observation that the PRR has assumed more stable
positions within the party and electoral system (De
Lange, 2012; Zaslove, 2008), the last decade has wit-
nessed a steady rise in scholars studying the impact
of PRR success on several domains, including the
party system (Mudde, 2014) and media debate
(Rooduijn, 2014). We restrict ourselves here to the
literature on the impact on policies, on PRR groups
themselves and on the public.
Policies and mainstream par ty positions
Given the PRR’s alleged threatening effect on the
position and rights of immigrants, it comes as no
surprise that scholars paid attention to the extent to
which the PRR was successful in implementing poli-
cies derived from its nativist, anti-immigration ideol-
ogy. Scholars have investigated whether governments
that included members of the PRR introduced
tougher policies on immigration and integration
(Akkerman, 2012; Heinisch, 2003; Luther, 2011;
Zaslove, 2004). These studies generally find no 
or a limited impact of the PRR on the policies 
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implemented. For instance, Akkerman (2012) con-
cludes on the basis of a quantitative analysis compar-
ing the immigration and integration output of 27
cabinets of varying composition in nine countries
(1996–2010) that when the PRR is in office, cabi-
nets generally introduce stricter immigration and
integration legislation than centre(-left) cabinets.
Yet, centre-right cabinets that do not include a PRR
do not differ in terms of strictness of immigration
policy from those including a PRR. She notes that
the difficulties these parties face in adapting to pub-
lic office seriously hinder their effectiveness to imple-
ment stricter policies (Akkerman, 2012; cf. Van
Spanje, 2011b). The finding of Zaslove (2008) that
the Austrian Freedom Party and Italian Lega Nord
(LN) have been instrumental in passing more restric-
tive immigration policy may thus be more due to the
performance of the conservative mainstream parties
that cooperate with them than because of the per-
formance of the PRR itself (cf. Heinisch, 2003). 
Although little evidence is thus found for a direct
impact of the PRR on policy outcome, the PRR
could influence policy making indirectly, via its
impact on other parties’ positions (Schain, 2006). As
such, scholars have investigated whether the PRR’s
success influences the policy positions on immigra-
tion, multiculturalism, populism, law and order, and
more style-related issues, such as anti-establishment
rhetoric (Bale, 2003; Bale et al., 2010; Han, 2014;
Immerzeel et al., 2016; Rooduijn et al., 2014; Van
Spanje, 2010; Williams, 2006). The argument is
simple and revolves around electoral returns. As for
instance Yılmaz (2012: 376) claims, ‘the mainstream
right [has] cynically adopted the cultural focus on
immigration in part to recapture the anti-immigrant,
anti-Muslim animosity that brought the populist far-
right electoral gains’. A similar vote-seeking logic
explains why the mainstream left is paralysed: ‘rather
than articulating their own vision for the future of
the nation (or Europe), they have quietly accepted
the basic premise of the Islamophobic/xenophobic
perspective in order to keep their constituency from
being attracted to the extreme right’. What about the
empirical proof for such claims?
To study these effects of the PRR, scholars used
either expert surveys, where colleagues are asked to
rate all political parties in a country on typical issues
(e.g. Hooghe et al., 2010; Immerzeel et al., 2011;
Van Spanje, 2010), or the salience of typical PRR
issues in the party programmes summarized in the
Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (e.g. Alonso
and Da Fonseca, 2012; Hooghe et al., 2010).
Akkerman (2015) used a more fine-grained mani-
festo content analysis (1989–2011), since the CMP
data lack sufficient detail on immigration and inte-
gration issues. 
The results of these studies can be easily summa-
rized: the PRR affects the stances of mainstream par-
ties on immigration and integration issues, but not
on other issues. Based on various expert surveys, Van
Spanje (2010) concluded that, in general, all other
political parties have become more restrictive with
respect to immigration and integration due to the
PRR’s success. Using manifesto data, Han (2014)
and Akkerman (2015) found similar effects. More
specifically, Akkerman (2015) finds that it was main-
ly Liberals who were tempted to co-opt far-right
positions while Social Democrats are not affected at
all – or at least their reaction is far from uniform
(Bale et al., 2010) – and Han (2014) shows that left-
wing parties only become less multicultural ‘when
the opinion of party supporters on foreigners
becomes more negative or when the parties lost more
votes in the previous election than their opponent
right-wing mainstream parties did’ (Han, 2014: 1). 
With regard to other issues, such as populism and
law and order, mainstream parties seem to hold to
their original ideological position (Bale et al., 2010).
On the basis of manifesto data (Rooduijn et al.,
2014) and expert surveys (Immerzeel et al., 2016),
scholars do not find that mainstream parties have
become more populist and authoritarian. 
Hence, there is evidence that the PRRs have an
indirect, but modest influence on policy outcomes.
This impact of the PRR on policy positions is gener-
ally limited to the issue of immigration and integra-
tion (Mudde, 2013). Specifically mainstream
right-wing parties employ a convergence strategy
that puts them ideologically closer to the PRR
(Meguid, 2005; Williams, 2006). However, main-
stream right parties are often inclined to move
toward stricter immigration policy anyway, inde-
pendently of PRR successes (Akkerman, 2015;
Alonso and Da Fonseca, 2012; Bale, 2003). This
conclusion also emerges from case studies, such as
the UK (Bale, 2013), France (Godin, 2013) and the
Netherlands (Van Heerden et al., 2014). 
Consequence for PRR par ties/movements 
There is also a growing scholarship on how successes
of the PRR affect these groups themselves. Most
importantly, what effect does the inclusion into a
governing coalition have on parties, both in terms of
their ideological positions and their electoral success
(Akkerman and De Lange, 2012; Akkerman and
Rooduijn, 2015; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2015;
Van Spanje, 2011b)? Heinisch (2003) argued that
because of their ideology, right-wing populist parties
thrive in opposition, but have trouble with actually
participating in a government. He claims that gov-
erning leads to more moderate positions and hence
to electoral losses. 
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However, there is no consensus regarding the
effect of taking up government responsibility on the
ideological positions and electoral success of the
PRR. Although there are several case studies, system-
atic tests of the so-called inclusion-moderation thesis
are scarce (Akkerman et al., 2016). Observers have
generalized too much from just two prominent cases
of failures, the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and
the Austrian FPÖ (Mudde, 2013).
Albertazzi and McDonnell (2010, 2015) dismiss
the received wisdom that populist parties have inher-
ent problems with assuming power. Their case stud-
ies of three populist parties in Italy and Switzerland
– Popolo della Libertà (PDL), LN and Schweizerische
Volkspartei (SVP) – show that PRR parties can thrive
and hold on to their radical positions when they take
up government responsibility (cf. Frölich-Steffen
and Rensmann, 2007). Likewise, Mudde (2013: 15)
disagrees with ‘the dominant strain in the populism
literature that argues that populist parties are des-
tined for success in opposition and failure in govern-
ment’. PRR can parties can keep ‘one foot in and one
foot out’ of government (Albertazzi and McDonnell,
2005). They will uphold their oppositional image,
by using radical rhetoric and pushing for radical
policies, rather than run the risk of being perceived
as a ‘normal’ governmental party and part of ‘the cor-
rupt elite’. Based on manifesto coding, Akkerman
and Rooduijn (2015) found that none of the ‘non-
ostracized’ parties in their study – the Swiss SVP,
Austrian FPÖ and Alliance for the Future of Austria
(BZÖ), Italian LN, Dutch LPF and Danish People’s
Party (DF) — became more moderate except the
Dutch PVV: its degree of radicalism strongly
decreased between 2010 and 2012. 
Overall, there is no indication that radical right-
wing populist parties are becoming less radical and
more ‘mainstream’ (Akkerman et al., 2016).
However, since only a limited amount of parties
actually took office, it remains to be seen whether
the costs of government are relatively higher for pop-
ulists. 
Citizens’ attitudes and behaviour
Third, the PRR’s emergence and success might have
consequences at the individual level. Citizens could
be affected in the sense that they attach more impor-
tance to certain issues, shift their views toward more
anti-immigration and authoritarian positions, and
change their political behaviour (Andersen and
Evans, 2003; Bohman, 2011; Braun, 2011; Dunn
and Singh, 2011; Immerzeel, 2015; Ivarsflaten,
2005; Semyonov et al., 2006; Sprague-Jones, 2011;
Van der Brug, 2003; Wilkes et al., 2007). PRR
groups can make some issues more salient (Bale,
2003; Ivarsflaten, 2005) and trigger politically disen-
gaged people to become actively or passionately
involved in politics (Jansen, 2011; Mouffe, 2005). 
Studies on the impact of PRR success on immi-
gration attitudes provide a mixed picture (Dunn and
Singh, 2011; Semyonov et al., 2006; Sprague-Jones,
2011). Some conclude that successful and highly vis-
ible PRR parties can undermine support for multi-
culturalism (Bohman, 2011), whereas others find no
effects of radical right representation on tolerance
among European populations. An extensive recent
study, based on European Social Survey data
(2002–2012), showed that PRR parties have not
driven anti-immigration attitudes in Europe
(Bohman and Hjerm, 2016). The main difficulty is
the lack of longitudinal studies, modelling the attitu-
dinal consequences of PRR success over time.
Evidence based on German and Dutch panel data
showed that perceptions of threatened group inter-
ests precipitate rather than follow citizens’ preferences
for PRR parties (Berning and Schlueter, 2016).
Regarding political involvement and trust, one
might expect that PRR parties foster voter turnout
because they are passionate mobilizers that fulfil a
watchdog function and reintroduce electoral compe-
tition (Franklin, 2004). For instance, Fallend (2012)
concludes that the Austrian FPÖ addressed issues
neglected by other parties, such as immigration and
integration. Accordingly, over the period
1996–2001, the party gave voice to an apolitical part
of the electorate, who increasingly felt that politi-
cians listened to them. Likewise, De Lange and
Akkerman (2012) showed that since 1997, political
trust and satisfaction with democracy in Belgium
have increased with the rise of the VB. However,
based on a Dutch six-wave panel study
(2008–2013), Rooduijn et al. (2016) find that the
popularity of populist parties fuels political discon-
tent, rather than dampens it (cf. Van der Brug,
2003).
De Lange and Akkerman (2012) found that in
Belgium electoral turnout numbers have decreased,
whereas the VB has become more popular, which
seems to contradict the idea that the PRR attracts
disengaged people. In the same vein, based on an
analysis of 33 European countries in the period
2002–2012, Immerzeel and Pickup (2015) find
there is no general positive influence of the PRR’s
popularity on electoral turnout. Yet, the Western
European PRR encourages some social groups to
turn out for national elections. These groups are,
however, people who are actually repelled by them:
the more highly educated and politically interested
are more inclined to ‘keep the rascals out’. To 
conclude, to speak of the PRR as ‘corrective of
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democracy’ is – in terms of increasing electoral
turnout or increasing political satisfaction – a misun-
derstanding. 
Another interesting question is how institutional-
ized and non-institutionalized forms of political par-
ticipation are related. Hutter (2014) finds that the
more successful the populist radical right is in elec-
toral terms, the more it tends to abstain from protest
activities. In a similar vein, access to political power
in a number of Western European countries over the
past years might have contributed to less right-wing
violence (Ravndal, 2016). Koopmans’ (1996) cross-
national comparison shows an inverse relation
between the success of PRR parties and the inci-
dence of racist violence. Hence, we can conclude
that the electoral channel effectively substitutes for
street activity and violence (cf. Braun and
Koopmans, 2010). 
The action repertoire of the PRR thus depends
on the political space made available by mainstream
parties for far-right mobilization (Giugni et al.,
2005). Most European countries have strong PRR
parties. But particularly in the United Kingdom and
Germany, xenophobic sentiments can hardly be
canalized through the electoral channel. It therefore
should perhaps not come as a surprise that both
countries have experiences with large-scale street
movements. Several scholars have interpreted the rise
of the English Defence League (EDL) and Britain
First as corollary of the decay of the British National
Party (BNP) (Alessio and Meredith, 2014; Allen,
2014). The EDL ‘offered a more attractive and con-
frontational alternative to perennial failure at the
ballot box’ (Ford and Goodwin, 2014: 8). The move-
ment hereby relied heavily on social media to get its
message across and recruit supporters (Busher,
2013). 
In sum, a weak or fragmented party sector corre-
sponds with a strong movement sector or environ-
ment of violence (Minkenberg, 2011). It remains to
be seen whether UKIP (in the UK) and Alternative
for Germany (AfD) will change this picture in the
future. Patzelt and Klose (2016) conclude that the
number of Pegida protesters has shrunk since the
AfD has increasingly succeeded to put their griev-
ances on the political agenda. Although several AfD
politicians have distanced themselves from Pegida
(Geiges et al., 2015), a survey showed that 57% of
the Pegida demonstrators in Dresden would vote for
AfD, and only about 4–5% for NPD (Reuband,
2015). 
Future directions: how to proceed? 
We conclude this review with a discussion of possi-
ble avenues for future research. Although the schol-
arship on this topic has become a ‘minor industry’
(Arzheimer, 2012: 35), there are important gaps and
opportunities. Concerning research questions, schol-
ars need to pay more attention to the temporal
dimension of political contention. Since
Minkenberg (2000: 170) observed that ‘serious com-
parative scholarship on the radical right is still in its
infancy’, cross-national comparisons have become
commonplace. Remarkably, however, comparisons
in time are still scarce (Ellinas, 2007; Kitschelt,
2007). A dynamic view would address the argument
that explanations for and consequences of PRR par-
ties and movements may change during their trajec-
tory. 
For instance, before groups pass the ‘threshold of
relevance’ (Carter, 2005; Ellinas, 2007) – i.e. are big
enough to matter – organizational attributes might
have no effect on their performance. And once pop-
ulist outsiders have established themselves as strong
and credible alternatives, traditional parties may not
win back electoral support if they adopt similar
agendas (Van Kessel, 2015). Likewise, the impact of
taking up government responsibility depends on
how long parties exist and whether they have institu-
tionalized (De Lange and Art, 2011). 
Cross-national comparisons have focused mainly
on the PRR’s electoral strength. The strength of
social movements and the interplay between move-
ments and parties have received relatively little atten-
tion. Except for Germany, there are few systematic
comparative studies of the non-party sector of the
PRR (Hutter, 2014; Minkenberg, 2005, 2011).
Individual-level research is needed on the question
whether the electoral channel effectively substitutes
for street activity, not only on the macro level
(Hutter, 2014; Koopmans, 1996). To what extent do
people refrain from using non-parliamentary means
to voice their grievances about multiculturalism and
immigration, due to electoral successes and/or gov-
ernment inclusion of PRR parties? Do extremist
activists perceive voting as a credible alternative
option? Minkenberg (2011) points out that support-
ers of PRR parties do not usually overlap with perpe-
trators of racist violence. Again, a dynamic
perspective is important: over time, movements can
turn into political parties, and parties can engage in
street demonstrations when they face political
obstruction. 
This brings us to future avenues for theoretical
progress. Both PRR actors and its competitors/oppo-
nents can adjust their action repertoire and ideology
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over time, which is insufficiently addressed by static,
spatial comparisons. Future scholarship could theo-
rize more about two key components that stem from
such an evolutionary perspective on parties and
movements: feedback and learning. Actors continu-
ally adapt to what has gone before and respond to
what other agents are doing. These ingredients make
political contention a so-called ‘complex adaptive
system’ (Laver and Sergenti, 2012). A fruitful tool to
map out dynamic interactions of adaptive individu-
als is agent-based modelling, but applications in the
PRR literature are scarce. 
In terms of confronting theories with empirical
evidence, future studies could be enriched by greater
attention to PRR parties and movements’ presence
on the Internet. The current debate on the role of the
Internet is characterized by much theoretical specu-
lation; we know little about how these groups use the
Internet for political communication and mobiliza-
tion (Caiani and Parenti, 2013). To date, to assess
where PRR groups stand, scholars often rely on man-
ifestos (Akkerman et al., 2016; Eger and Valdez,
2015), expert surveys (Immerzeel et al., 2016) and
traditional media outlets (Bos and Brants, 2014;
Kriesi et al., 2008). 
Few citizens actually read party manifestos. Most
people perceive politics by what they read in the
media instead (Kriesi et al., 2008). Obviously, using
mass media also has a significant drawback, since
coverage might be biased (Helbling and Tresch,
2011). These caveats could be overcome by relying
on sources that are widely consumed by citizens and
controlled by PRR parties and movements them-
selves, such as Facebook pages (Arzheimer, 2015a) or
tweets (Van Kessel and Castelein, 2016). 
Social media material could also enrich our
understanding of supporters and sympathizers, in
addition to surveys or interviews. For instance,
Arzheimer (2015a, 2015b) concludes that the
German AfD does not qualify as either nativist or
populist, but statements of Facebook fans hint at
more radical currents among supporters and rank-
and-file members. The topics that people devote
most attention to (Islam and immigration) are hard-
ly mentioned in AfD’s own posts.
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résumé Cet article analyse trois points parmi les connaissances actuelles sur la droite radicale et
populiste en Europe occidentale. Nous évaluons tout d’abord les explications sur l’opportunité politique
de la réussite de la droite radicale et populiste. Nous traitons ensuite des approches de l’offre interne, en
nous référant au leadership, à l’organisation et au positionnement idéologique. Enfin, nous examinons la
recherche sur les conséquences de la montée de ces partis et mouvements : constituent-ils une correction
ou une menace pour la démocratie ? Pour conclure, cet article propose de nouvelles pistes de théorisation
et de recherche. 
mots-clés droite radicale ◆ extrême droite ◆ partis/mouvements anti-immigration ◆ populisme
resumen En este artículo se revisan tres vertientes de la investigación sobre la derecha radical populista
(DRP) en Europa Occidental. En primer lugar, se evalúan las explicaciones de oportunidad política para
las fortunas de la DRP. En segundo lugar, se comentan los enfoques internos centrados en la oferta en
relación con el liderazgo, la organización y el posicionamiento ideológico. En tercer lugar, se analizan las
investigaciones sobre las consecuencias del auge de dichos partidos y movimientos: ¿constituyen un
correctivo o una amenaza para la democracia? La revisión concluye con la exposición de futuras vías de
teorización e investigación. 
palabras clave derecha radical ◆ extrema derecha ◆ partidos/movimientos antiinmigración ◆
populismo
